Abstract-In this paper, security analysis of block ciphers with key length greater than block length is proposed. When key length is significantly greater than block length and the statistical distribution of cipher system is like a uniform distribution, there are more than one key which map fixed input to fixed output. If a block cipher designed sufficiently random, it is expected that the key space can be classified into same classes. Using such classes of keys, our proposed algorithm would be able to recover the key of block cipher with complexity
INTRODUCTION
In design of secure block cipher, one of the main steps is selection of key and input block length. There are some standard block ciphers like KASUMI , IDEA, 3DES, AES-256 which have block length smaller than key length. Since these ciphers have considered as pseudo-random generator, their key space can be classified into equivalency class of keys with the same number of elements. For instance, assuming randomness of KASUMI's output, the key space would have 64 2 key classes which each contains 64 2 different keys.
In our proposed attack algorithm, we assumed that there is an efficient algorithm which computes the equivalency class of an arbitrary key.
As an application of this method, we propose an efficient algorithm for computing equivalency class of arbitrary key for one-round and 2-round KASUMI block cipher which can be extended to full round KASUMI. Hence, in the rest, we give a short introduction to KASUMI block cipher.
KASUMI is modified version of the block cipher MISTY1 [1] , which is optimized for hardware performance. In the past few years, it has received a lot of attentions from the cryptographic researcher. Kuhn introduced the impossible differential attack on 6-round KASUMI [2] , which has been recently extended to 7-round KASUMI [3] . In 2007, a higher order differential attack has been published on 5-round KASUMI with practical complexity [4] . Since the key schedule of KASUMI is linear, many related-key attacks have published. A related-key differential attack on 6-round KASUMI has presented in 2002 [5] . The first related-key attack on the full 8-round KASUMI was proposed by Biham et al.with 76.1 2 encryptions [6] , which was improved to a practical related-key attack on the full KASUMI by Dunkelman et al. [7] However, assumption for these kinds of attacks is controlling over the differences of two or more related keys in all the 128 key bits. With this assumption, resulting attack is inapplicable in most real-world usage scenarios [8] .
In this paper, we proposed a new attack based on relation between key length and block length of a block cipher. When key length is significantly greater than block length and cipher system has a statistical properties like an uniform distribution, there is a key classes with
is corresponding encryption algorithm [9] .
Using this observation, we construct an equivalency class of those keys satisfied in ( ) 0
. In the rest of this paper, we assume that for every block cipher algorithm E, there is an algorithm which computes efficiently the equivalency class of an arbitrary key. Our method can be applied to block cipher like KASUMI, IDEA, AES-256, 3DES, etc.
In this paper, first we introduce our new method and then it will apply to reduced-round KASUMI block cipher. In section II, we introduce details of our method. In section III, the method has applied to KASUMI. In section V, we propose an algorithm for generating equivalency classes of KASUMI key space. Finally, after experimental results, we will give some suggestions and recommendations for future works.
in which n is block length and k is key length.
When key length is significantly greater than block length and the statistical distribution of cipher system is like a uniform distribution, there are
It simply can prove that the following relation is an equivalency relation.
K' K~
In the rest of the paper, [ ]
. For every block cipher algorithm E, suppose that there is an algorithm which efficiently computes the equivalency class of an arbitrary key.
Following algorithm will be able to recover the unknown key 0
Algorithm 1:
We use pseudo-randomness properties of encryption algorithm and it is expected that there is exactly one key such
. For finding equivalence key, it would be sufficient to search whole keys in [ ]
. It can be done using rainbow-tables and time-memory-data-trade-off methods with complexity lower than 2 n . In this section, we apply our proposed method to 2-rounds KASUMI block cipher. By finding some weakness in FO and FL functions, we will improve our method by using them. In the rest, first we introduce briefly the general structure of KASUMI block cipher and then properties of functions that used in KASUMI are discussed.
Since

A. KASUMI block cipher
KASUMI is a block cipher used in the security of 3GPP systems such as UMTS, GSM and GPRS. Both the confidentiality (f8) and integrity function (f9) in UMTS are based on KASUMI. In GSM, KASUMI is used in the A5/3 algorithm for generating key stream and in GPRS in the GEA3 key stream generator.
KASUMI is an 8-round Feistel block cipher algorithm; it operates on 64 bit input to produce 64 bit output under a 128-bit key. In each round, there are two functions: the FO function which is a 3-round, 32-bit Feistel structure, and the FL function which receives 32-bit as input and produces 32-bit output. The order of using two mentioned functions in the cipher is affected by the round number. In the odd round the first function is FL and in the even round the FO function is used first.
The FO function also uses four-round Feistel FI function in a recursive structure. The FI function receives 16-bit as input and produce 16-bit as output. It uses two S-boxes S7 ( 7-bit to 7-bit permutation) and S9 (9-bit to 9-bit permutation).
Using a simple key schedule of figure 1, the round function uses a round key which consists of eight 16-bit sub keys derived from the original 128-bit key. The FL function uses 32-bit sub-keys We start with FI function which is the core function for giving non-linearity to the cipher algorithm. figure 3 show, there are two -boxes S7 (7-bit to 7-bit permutation) and S9 (9-bit to 9-bit permutation). In the following, we give some properties for the FI function. 
B. FI function properties
Where x, y and KI are input, output and key. Having two members of the set {x,y,KI}, the third one is uniquely computed efficiently. In fact, if {x,KI} or {y,KI} is known, using encryption and decryption algorithm, (1) 
In fact, it is sufficient to find keys such that
It is clear that the number of keys which (2) 
Equation (4) can be rewritten as follow.
( )
Finally, we have is one the simple components in the KASUMI block cipher. We introduce some properties of FL function.
D. FL function properties
1. By fixing FL sub-keys, the function is one-to-one related to the input. But this isn't correct for the subkeys by fixing the input. 
Using (7), it is possible to classify all the FL sub-keys.
IV. AN ALGORITHM FOR GENERATING EQUIVALENCE KEYS IN THE FIRST ROUND
In this section, using mentioned properties for function that used in KASUMI, we propose an efficient algorithm for finding class of keys which map fixed input 0 P to fixed output According to cipher structure, there are some relations between input and output of 2-round KASUMI block cipher as follow.
RKL is the sub-key of first round for KL.
Consequently, it needs to solve a system of equations for recovering unknown sub-keys. ( )
is the main key of the cipher for producing key schedule.
In our algorithm, we guess FL function sub-keys for the first two round, then using FO function equations (3) (4) (5) (6) , the other sub-keys can be computed. In fact, in the first two rounds, these FL sub-keys are
. We represent our proposed algorithm in which the unknown key values show by capital letters.
Solve the following equations,
It can be shown that if we would be able to find some part of keys, the other part of key can be computed uniquely. In this algorithm, when we find 6 K , sub-key 5 K can be computed from the first equation of algorithm 2. Using the second equation of algorithm 2,
can be computed.
For correctness, these sub-key values should be check with the additional check equation in the second part of the first equation of algorithm 2.
It should be noted that, in algorithm 2, solving strategy can be every appropriate strategy for solving equations. For example we can replace this strategy with exhaustive search or algebraic methods to find 6 K and then compute the rest of sub-key values.
Complexity of the algorithm 2 depends on solving strategy. In the worst case, if exhaustive search method is used, the complexity of algorithm will be 80 2 which is the best one with regards to number of key bits.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Since KASUMI block cipher has 64-bit block length and 128-bit key length, based on birthday paradox, when a fixed input encrypts with 32 2 different keys, there will be at least two equal cipher-text with probability more than ½. With P=0 (plain-text with 64 bit zero), there are at least two keys that encryption of P lead to same cipher-text.
Using such keys, we get output of the sixth round KASUMI; we wrote equations for last two round and the results are compared. We run our algorithm on 4,6,7-rounds KASUMI separately and obtain some equivalence keys. For 6-round KASUMI, we found three keys with same cipher-text. It can be inferred that 6-round KASUMI shows more nonrandom properties and it can be vulnerability for KASUMI block cipher, since we expected two keys with same cipher with considering 2 32 different keys.
VII. CONCLUSIONS In this respect, we proposed a new attack on block cipher algorithms with key length greater than block length, if it would be possible to efficiently classify the key space of corresponding block cipher. In fact, the complexity of attack will be
where n is block length and k is key length.
Some recommendations for continuing this work are as follow.
1. Extend our algorithm to higher rounds of KASUMI block cipher.
2. Solving algebraic equations obtained by 2-rounds KASUMI in an efficient way. 5. Classification of the key space of other cipher algorithms such as IDEA, 3DES, AES-256 with key length greater than block length.
6. Combining this method with other known attack to achieve a near practical attack algorithm.
